Last week, the government of the Republic of Cyprus, as represented by the Greek-Cypriots, began drilling for gas in the sea waters south of the island. This was met with scepticism from Turkey, who threatened with retaliation and soon signed a declaration with the self-declared Turkish-Cypriot state in north Cyprus that provided for future gas exploitation in the sea north of Cyprus and between the island and Turkey. These developments are directly related to the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus problem and are indicative of the lack of a common ‘Cypriot’ ground and attitude that could facilitate the resolution of the inter-communal dispute, based on the reunification of the two communities under a federal state.

The decision of the Greek-Cypriot side to seek gas exploitation has been probably reinforced by the recent energy and economic crisis in the Republic of Cyprus, following the damage of the biggest power station after an accidental explosion. However, it unveils the keenness of Greek-Cypriots to regard themselves as the sole representatives of Cyprus. Indeed, Greek-Cypriots have any reason to feel and act like that since, after the gradual division of the island and the Turkish-Cypriot absence from the bi-communal state established in 1960, the international community has continued to recognise the Republic of Cyprus, as now represented solely by the Greek-Cypriots. It is though this unilateral and strategically important action in the name of the Republic of Cyprus and in complete absence of any Turkish-Cypriot involvement which emphasises the distance between the two communities and works counter-productively with regards to the achievement of a federative solution of the Cyprus problem.

On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriots have always sought to match the Greek-Cypriot initiatives in the island, more often than not with greater integration with the ‘motherland’ Turkey, which has always maintained strong links with them. As early as the colonial period of Cyprus, the goal of Greek-Cypriots to unite the island with Greece was countered by Turkish-Cypriot claims for division of the country between Greece and Turkey. More recently, the Greek-Cypriot efforts for EU integration were matched with deeper integration between Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. Now, the Greek-Cypriot attempts for energy exploitation are met by an agreement between Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriots to pursue similar activity in the sea area between Cyprus and Turkey. Again, this is a move that contradicts the efforts for resolution based on a compromise and under a common bi-communal state. Acting in the name of the unilaterally declared (and internationally unrecognised) Turkish-Cypriot state, especially with regards to sensitive matters such as energy and towards greater integration with Turkey, goes against reconciliation and denotes little affiliation to a common Cypriot future.

After the failure of reunification based on the Annan Plan in 2004, the hopes for a final resolution of the Cyprus problem have been disappointed. Almost four years since the official opening of new round of talks, progress in negotiations is staggering. With the deadline for the achievement of agreement set for late 2011, the developments with regards to the energy matters are only an indication of how far the two communities remain from investing in a common ‘Cypriot’ future and cooperating for the reunification of the island.

The article investigates Turkey’s impact on the Turkish Cypriot political parties before, during and after the Annan Plan referenda. It is argued that before the referenda on the “Annan Plan”, a variety of reasons (the most important being the strong prospects for Turkey’s EU candidacy) led Ankara to support a compromising solution to the Cyprus issue. In contrast, in the post-Annan era, the slower pace of Turkey’s EU integration as well as thestaggering negotiations on the Cyprus issue have not allowed for an equally decisive role of Ankara in Turkish Cypriot political parties.

After almost two years of negotiations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, it looks that, for the first time, a series of emerging catalysts contribute to the materialisation of another, lifetime opportunity.

Change of Turkish policy

In recent months, Turkish policy towards the Cyprus issue has become considerably more flexible. Most recent and prominent gesture of Ankara’s good will is the open support of bicommunal, bizonal federation as a solution to the Cyprus problem (in contrast to quite often co-federation support) and of the total demilitarisation of the island which has been a long-standing taboo for Turkish policy (especially among the military circles). This more productive attitude is well in accordance to country’s recent efforts to project herself as a ‘soft power’ in the wider region; this new diplomatic approach has led to vital alterations of Turkish policy towards series of other ‘hot’ domestic matters such as the Armenian and Kurdish issue. Last but not least, this policy flexibility is serving Turkey’s focal aspiration of joining the European Union which still pushes the candidate country towards supportive to the Cyprus problem attitudes.

Change of Greek policy

Similarly, the other side of the Aegean Sea has also seen chief changes. Greece, as represented by the newly elected government of George Papandreou, is defined by an increasingly outward-looking foreign policy. Among the basic lines of this new policy is the establishment of good relations with the neighbour countries, including Turkey; in this context, the promotion of solution to the Cyprus problem is a major step towards building bridges between Athens and Ankara. Indicative for the Greek intentions is the fact that Turkey and Cyprus were among the very first diplomatic destinations of the newly elected Prime Minister. Besides, George Papandreou is the best-received Greek politician in Ankara as a result of the Greco-Turkish reconciliation efforts that he led while serving the Foreign Ministry post in late nineties.

EU initiatives

Recently, there has been extensive interest of international actors with regards to the Cyprus problem. UN and EU have been backing up the negotiations since the beginning, leaving however the two Cypriot leaders to control the process. Nevertheless, the running Spanish presidency of EU has recently intensified the efforts for mediation, mainly through the proposal of an international conference which will include (most probably) the two Cypriot communities, Greece, Turkey. Britain, EU and UN. Turkey is supporting that option since early stages of the negotiations but, for the first time, the Greek/ Greek-Cypriot side seem to be also positive about it. It should be underlined that this is the very first time that EU is trying to obtain a pro-active supporting position of the peace process in Cyprus that carries increased importance for its international actorness.

Progress in the negotiations

Besides, in practise, important progress has been achieved on the negotiations between the two sides and their efforts to come up with a comprehensive plan that will resolve the Cyprus issue. The chapter on governance, one of the most difficult ones, is effectively agreed, the chapter on EU and international affairs and economy that are currently under discussion seem also to be characterised by wide agreement. The final two chapters related to the territorial and property issues, although challenging, are thought to be incapable of evoking an impasse on the agreement if the rest is consented.

Change in the Greek Cypriot Front

Another important and new factor is the changes in the Greek Cypriot side. The recent opposition to the Greek Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias has eased; the President now enjoys greater support for his tactics within the negotiations that were for long disputed.  Besides, Christofias addressed the counterproductive mystery surrounding the context of the negotiations. He openly informed people on what is actually discussed thus limiting the room for misinformation that will poison the peace process. This last point acquires major political and practical significance if we take into account that the misinformation/ misguidance of the Greek Cypriots with regards to the resolution of the Cyprus issue has been proposed as a central reason for people to vote against previous resolution plans (most notably, the Annan Plan in 2004).

Change in the Turkish Cypriot Front

The Turkish Cypriot ‘presidential elections’ this April will be a milestone for the progress and outcome of the negotiations. The present pro-solution ‘President’ of the community, Mehmet Ali Talat, is facing fierce competition from the more inflexible towards the negotiations ‘Prime Minster’ Dervis Eroglu. Eroglu, although initially tipped as a favourite, he constantly looses ground to Talat and, at the moment, all the possibilities are open. In case of election of Eroglu is almost definite to assume that this round of negotiations, is effectively dead. In case of Talat’s re -election, it is almost certain that the procedure will intensify and the already important momentum will grow even bigger for a final and lasting solution to the 36 years old Cyprus problem.

During the last European Council meeting, EU leaders made their position towards the Greek economic crisis clear: Greece will have EU’s help if the measures taken by the country fail to tackle the economic problems. In other words, Brussels will make sure that Greece will not need EU’s assistance; towards this direction, EU has proposed some austere monitoring and consultation mechanisms that will allow central EU bodies (such as the EU commission and the European Central Bank) to supervise (and guide) the policy of the Greek government towards addressing the economic problems. This EU strategy has an explicit aim: to make sure that Greeks will undertake all the efforts needed in order to solve their domestic problems without a European helping hand; EU will show the way to the necessary measures to safeguard that this Greek modern tragedy will have one and only protagonist: the Greeks themselves.

All these have been rather awkwardly received in the Mediterranean country. A country that has always been defined by strong pro-EU attitudes and narratives (a direct result of the important benefits the country enjoyed as a result of EU membership throughout last decades), is now reluctant and sceptical about the EU. People are getting defensive towards a Union that, according to them, ‘is playing tricks with Greece’, ‘is exploiting their misery’ and ‘does not run to their assistance that they deserve as an equal EU partner’. Once again, quite in line with the concept of tragedy, Greeks look out for a deus ex machina, to divinely intervene and solve the problems for them. This time however, it looks that Greeks will be alone in facing the nemesis of their very own mistakes.

Because, this tragedy, although related to the global recession, is not a result of it; instead, it is the final dramatic act of the Modern Greek post-1974 political turmoil and the product of consequent Greek governments that were unable to identify (and even more timid to address) Greek political system’s very own faults (e.g. corruption or the reform of the pension system are problems that have been around unresolved years before the recent economic crisis). In addition to that, EU will stay reluctant towards a rather untalented player of the EU stage until now; Greece has failed to behave as a legitimate partner in the EU environment (with the directly related to the economic crisis scandal of the statistical service being a striking example). As a result, Greek pleas for assistance in the base of this partnership look (and are), largely, irrelevant.

All in all, this Greek tragedy that just started has no divine intervention. Let’s hope, that will have, at least, a catharsis.

Quite unsurprisingly, Greek Cypriot political elites have been recently arguing that a solution worse (for the Greek Cypriot side) to the Annan Plan solution won’t be supported. Although expected, this position fails to account for long-term realities in the island of Cyprus.

It is by now a common truth that every new proposal for the resolution of the Cyprus issue has been less favourable for the Greek Cypriot side than the previous one; Evangelos Averof quite cleverly titled his work on the Cyprus issue as ‘history of opportunities lost’ (‘Ιστορικό Χαμένων Ευκαιριών’). As a result of policies of the Turkish Cypriot side (property, settlers policies etc), the state of affairs in Cyprus is constantly changing and thus new realities are created that make every new solution put forward less favourable to the Greek Cypriot side. Although this does not mean that the south should be dragged by those realities into concessions, there is a need to understand those realities if a lasting solution is desired.

The most important reality that needs to be faced in Cyprus of 2010 is that the prospects of partition in case of failure of a resolution are greater than ever before. The day after a failure of the ongoing Christofias- Talat negotiations will be a different one for Cyprus where the opportunity to reunite the island will be, quite for ever, lost.

With the looming European Council Summit next week, there is great discussion about the prospects of EU-Turkey relations and the role of Cyprus issue in this context. More than ever before, a great balancing act from the part of EU is needed.

The central role of Turkey-EU relations within the Cyprus issue has been clear. Back in 2004, Turkey pushed Turkish Cypriots to accept the UN-proposed ‘Annan Plan’ for the resolution of the Cyprus issue in order to facilitate her own accession*. Five years later, series of reasons have weakened this remarkable change in Turkish policy towards Cyprus matters; Turkey’s role in the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus issue, although supporting, is far more reluctant than before. For that, the slow down in Turkey-EU relations for a number of reasons (enlargement fatigue, rise of Turko-sceptics, Republic of Cyprus veto etc.) has played a crucial role. Accordingly, Turkish domestic support for EU membership has dropped from 62% in 2004 to 41% in 2008 (Eurobarometer 2004, 2008). This public climate has given rise to nationalist elements within Turkey, something that makes the government’s mission even harder as a more flexible policy towards Cyprus becomes politically costly. Finally, the Greco-Turkish rapprochement has also lost its previous momentum (1999) under the Greek government of Karamanlis (2004-2009) with a negative impact on the relations of Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle.

As a result, EU has a rather challenging mission before this Summit. Pushing Ankara towards a more cooperative strategy is indeed something that would potentially contribute to the ongoing talks on the Cyprus issue**; a more flexible Turkish stance will consequently trigger a similar cooperative Greek Cypriot stance that will apparently boost the negotiation process (to what extend this will happen is still debateable). At the same time, EU needs to be conscious of a country that, seeing her EU prospects fading away, looses interest both at public and political elites’ level. On the words of the Turkish State Minister and chief EU negotiator Mr Egemen Bagis, ‘EU is not a sine qua non’ for Turks. Therefore, while EU indeed needs to (once again) use the card of Turkey-EU relations to provoke a more reconciliation strategy on Cyprus, this has to be done carefully. Annan Plan taught us the important role of Turkey-EU relations for Cyprus; the aftermath of Anna Plan, taught us this role’s limits. EU needs to keep a balance between playing the card of EU- Turkey relations and keeping those relations alive enough to be played out. What prompted Ankara’s cooperative stance in the ‘Annan Plan’ were the prospects of EU- What has weakened this stance is the exact reduction of those prospects. In this context, EU can indeed be an important player in the Cyprus issue, but, all in good measure.

*based on the Helsinki European Council Summit 1999 conclusions, a Turkish contribution to the Cyprus resolution efforts would facilitate the country’s own accession process.

*One of the most illuminative examples for Ankara’s inflexible strategy is the continuous refusal to fully apply the so-called Additional Protocol and open her ports to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey refuses to open the ports to Cypriots vehicles on the ground that this would create recognition claims for the Republic of Cyprus as administrated by the Greek Cypriots. In addition, Ankara is (unsuccessfully until now) using this refusal to bargain the lifting of the Turkish Cypriot isolation (in practise, to bargain the approval of the pending Direct Trade Regulation that allows for better trade conditions between Turkish Cypriots and EU member states). It has been repeatedly claimed by the Greek Cypriot side that the application of Protocol will be well-received as a good will gesture.

Series of signs and reports lately denote the construction/ emergence of a new cooperative towards the Greek and Greek Cypriot side strategy of Ankara with related consequences for the Turkish/ Turkish Cypriot stance towards the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus issue. Along this lines, the looming assessment of Turkey’s EU progress this December seems to play an important role. This Turkish attitude has, reasonably, raised the hopes with regards to the resolution of the long standing dispute. Of course, Ankara is yet to make these intentions much more clear and, most of all, practise, but towards this road the Greek/ Greek Cypriot side should be very conscious of the past and the lessons that could be taught in this context.

Quitle simiarly to what is happening at the moment, back in the start of the millennium the then newly elected Justice and Development (AKP) party of Erdogan was breaking with years of inflexible policy towards the Cyprus issue to finally promote (and push the Turkish Cypriots for) a reunification of the island. Again, the linkage of Cyprus resolution to Turkey’s own EU progress is thought to have played a very important role. In contrast, the Greek Cypriot side, having safeguarded their accession to the EU regardless of a resolution, hardened their position, attacked the UN resolution ‘Annan plan’ and guided the masses to its rejection. As a result, Greek Cypriots became the black sheep of Europe thought to be the sole responsible for the accession of a divided island into the EU family and the continuation of the partition of the island. For years, the international community has been rather frustrated with the tactics of the Greek Cypriot side; frustration has only recently eased, largely as a result of the succession of  the late Papadopoulos with the more moderate Christophias at the Greek Cypriot leadership.

What happened in early 00’s has some very interesting lessons to provide. A potential flexibility shown by Turkey/ Turkish Cypriots in the forthcoming period is not to be seen as an opportunity for the Greek Cypriot side to push for more concessions. The veto power that the Greek Cypriot side is armed with regarding the EU future of Turkey has been seriously overestimated and a possibly Greek Cypriot arrogant position would bring even more frustration repeating what happened in the aftermath of the ‘Annan Plan”s rejection. The display of Greek Cypriot intransigence not only would hurt their prestige but would also undermine the overall reunification process. Greek Cypriots should understand that a potential Turkish good will should be met with a similar Greek/ Greek Cypriot cooperative attitude. A potential repeat of history won’t be in a favour neither of Greek Cypriots nor for Cyprus.       

Inasmuch challenged for his ability to handle Greek domestic politics- a challenge which could fail big way as the first days at the Prime Minster office might leave us assume-, George Papandreou’s keenness on international politics is beyond doubt; his time at the post of Foreign Minister has been his career’s brightest moment and a great source of legitimisation of his political actorness. One of his main achievements has been claimed to be the thaw of the Greco-Turkish relations with important implications for the Cypriot politics.

Papandreou undertook the Greek Foreign Ministry post after a rather turbulent period for the country’s relations with Turkey. Nineties saw series of crises between the two sides (Ocalan case, S-300 missiles in Cyprus, Aegean dispute) which brought the two countries literally in the brick of a war (Imia/Kardak crisis 1996). Acquiring an agenda of that difficulty, Papandreou managed to bring the two sides of the Aegean closer than ever. Series of agreements concerning economy, trade, tourism, people etc were signed while the peak of this successful foreign strategy was the Greek constructive position towards the final recognition of Turkey as a candidate for EU membership; the development of greater links between Turkey and EU fitted the ‘Europeanisation’ agenda of the then PASOK government which in foreign matters was translated into an effort for integration of Greece’s neighbours into the EU environment.

With regards to the Cyprus issue in particular, this reconciliation strategy towards Turkey, also impacted Cypriot politics; Ankara, under the EU membership candidacy factor, developed a more reconciliational policy towards Cyprus problem which brought Turkish Cypriots to vote for moderate political forces (Talat and the Republican Turkish Party) and ‘yes’ in the reunification of the island based on the UN proposed Annan Plan. Reunification was never fulfilled as Greek Cypriots voted against it. But it has to be noted here that PASOK was the only Greek political force to openly support the resolution based on the Annan Plan, a fact which clearly denotes the difference of the party in their stance towards Cypriot politics.

It is thus of no surprise that the rise of Papandreou at the Prime Ministry is considered a positive development with regards to the solution of the Cyprus issue. The self-placement of Papandreou at the head of the Foreign Ministry and the choice of Turkey as the first abroad destination to visit only some days after his election indicates the importance that the leader still pays at Greek international diplomacy and especially the relations between the two neighbour countries; visiting Cyprus last week-again one of the very first stops since undertaking the Greek leadership- is also indicative for the continuous importance the new government is giving to the Cyprus issue.

The end of negotiations on the Cyprus issue is still way ahead and it has become clear that is not going to be an easy road. However, the rise of PASOK with Papandreou on the lead can only be regarded as a positive development. The new Prime Minister looks to be decisive to bring back the successful days of Greek foreign diplomacy. Turkey looks to be of a primal importance in this context, and so does the Cypriot problem which, for quite some time, looked totally forgotten by the Athenian circles. In this context, the new Greek government might give a different dynamic in the process. Not only a better Greco-Turkish interaction will be beneficial for the resolution efforts but the involvement of the Greek government might provide a valuable perspective on the evolution of negotiations, especially in the context of EU. Papandreou and his team are well received at Brussels and have a very good knowledge of the EU affairs. This is potentially a valuable tool in series of issues related to the negotiations, most notably the way Turkey’s EU accession could be constructively used (an issue which looks to be rather clumsily handled by the Greek Cypriot side).

Those are some examples of how Greece, EU, Cyprus and Turkey could interact under the light of the new developments and it is still early to make any assumptions.  Papandreou visits to Turkey and Cyprus did not clearly indicate how the issues will be handled. It is however safe to argue that the rise of Papandreou makes the following months-at least- interesting with the looming  assessment of Turkey’s EU progress this December perhaps a very significant moment.

In their most recent report on Cyprus, international Crisis Group puts the international community, and mainly the Cypriots themselves, in front of a rather strong but more realistic than ever dilemma: Solution or Partition? No matter how many times the phrase ‘last chance’ has accompanied different efforts of resolution (most notably the Annan Plan in 2004), the ongoing negotiations are indeed the very last opportunity to solve the Cyprus problem as the day after the referenda, one way or another, is going to be a totally different era for Cyprus.

First it was Rauf Denktas’ intransigence. A whole era in Cypriot politics marked from numerous resolution attempts that failed largely due to the rejectionist stance of the Turkish Cypriot side; of course this did not allowed for the Greek Cypriot stance to be effectively tested.

When finally Turkish Cypriots moved away from rejectionism and in a velvet revolution replaced Denktas with pro-solution/ EU leader Mehmet Ali Talat, Greek Cypriot stance was unveiled in its worse; Papadopoulo’s resounding ‘No’ to the Annan plan put an end to the most promising resolution plan until then.

And then, four years later, the moderate Talat found a similar counterpart of his in the face of Dimitris Christophias who succeeded Papadopoulos at the Greek Cypriot leadership. Negotiations have been going on for more than a year and despite the initial hopes, clouds look to cast their shadow over the negotiations table. However, both sides as well as the international community need to understand that a solution is close- what is at stake is whether this solution is a solution that is going to be agreed by the Cypriots or a solution imposed by their failure to agree.

Some days ago I posted about the Greek Cypriot inability to understand some of the EU realities in relation to the Cyprus problem. It is also true however that these EU realities are not better understood at the other side of the Green Line either.

Turkish Cypriots are insisting on the hot issue of Turkey’s guarantee over them in the same way their compatriots Greek Cypriots reject it. As a result of the traumatic experiences during 60’s which also led to the failure of the effort to establish a partnership Cypriot state, Turkish Cypriots are deeply reluctant about a potential federal state which they fear would end up to be controlled by the Greek Cypriots. In this context, Turkey comes as a guarantor of their multiaspect security. However, things have moved on since the ‘60s. The world has moved on and, above all, Cyprus was moved on, apparently, on its European way.

In a new European Cyprus, actions that Turkish Cypriots are concerned about go directly against the EU law which member states have adapted and comply with. In this context, the internal performance of the state is sufficiently guaranteed by the legal and political framework within which the state has to operate. At the same, the relations of the EU member state with both the rest of the EU members or third countries is also stabilised to a great extend- EU has been an ideal place of stability throughout its history. All those features of the EU create a safety net enough to battle the most deep-rooted Turkish Cypriot insecurities. Turkey in or out of the EU makes no difference to a member state Cyprus which is internally and externally safeguarded under the EU umbrell which becomes gradually stronger through EU’s deepening and widening progress.

It is true that the failure of Turkish Cypriots to understand the EU realities and their benefits is a bit more reasonable in compare to Greek Cypriots. In contrast to southern of the Green Line, Turkish Cypriots have been for years isolated from the international and European environment, a fact with obvious implications in the understanding of realities of those environments. in this context, It is also down to the EU to introduce its good and safe self also to the north part of Cyprus and fight the insecurities nested in it towards adressing the problems created by the accession of a divided island.