With the looming European Council Summit next week, there is great discussion about the prospects of EU-Turkey relations and the role of Cyprus issue in this context. More than ever before, a great balancing act from the part of EU is needed.

The central role of Turkey-EU relations within the Cyprus issue has been clear. Back in 2004, Turkey pushed Turkish Cypriots to accept the UN-proposed ‘Annan Plan’ for the resolution of the Cyprus issue in order to facilitate her own accession*. Five years later, series of reasons have weakened this remarkable change in Turkish policy towards Cyprus matters; Turkey’s role in the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus issue, although supporting, is far more reluctant than before. For that, the slow down in Turkey-EU relations for a number of reasons (enlargement fatigue, rise of Turko-sceptics, Republic of Cyprus veto etc.) has played a crucial role. Accordingly, Turkish domestic support for EU membership has dropped from 62% in 2004 to 41% in 2008 (Eurobarometer 2004, 2008). This public climate has given rise to nationalist elements within Turkey, something that makes the government’s mission even harder as a more flexible policy towards Cyprus becomes politically costly. Finally, the Greco-Turkish rapprochement has also lost its previous momentum (1999) under the Greek government of Karamanlis (2004-2009) with a negative impact on the relations of Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle.

As a result, EU has a rather challenging mission before this Summit. Pushing Ankara towards a more cooperative strategy is indeed something that would potentially contribute to the ongoing talks on the Cyprus issue**; a more flexible Turkish stance will consequently trigger a similar cooperative Greek Cypriot stance that will apparently boost the negotiation process (to what extend this will happen is still debateable). At the same time, EU needs to be conscious of a country that, seeing her EU prospects fading away, looses interest both at public and political elites’ level. On the words of the Turkish State Minister and chief EU negotiator Mr Egemen Bagis, ‘EU is not a sine qua non’ for Turks. Therefore, while EU indeed needs to (once again) use the card of Turkey-EU relations to provoke a more reconciliation strategy on Cyprus, this has to be done carefully. Annan Plan taught us the important role of Turkey-EU relations for Cyprus; the aftermath of Anna Plan, taught us this role’s limits. EU needs to keep a balance between playing the card of EU- Turkey relations and keeping those relations alive enough to be played out. What prompted Ankara’s cooperative stance in the ‘Annan Plan’ were the prospects of EU- What has weakened this stance is the exact reduction of those prospects. In this context, EU can indeed be an important player in the Cyprus issue, but, all in good measure.

*based on the Helsinki European Council Summit 1999 conclusions, a Turkish contribution to the Cyprus resolution efforts would facilitate the country’s own accession process.

*One of the most illuminative examples for Ankara’s inflexible strategy is the continuous refusal to fully apply the so-called Additional Protocol and open her ports to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey refuses to open the ports to Cypriots vehicles on the ground that this would create recognition claims for the Republic of Cyprus as administrated by the Greek Cypriots. In addition, Ankara is (unsuccessfully until now) using this refusal to bargain the lifting of the Turkish Cypriot isolation (in practise, to bargain the approval of the pending Direct Trade Regulation that allows for better trade conditions between Turkish Cypriots and EU member states). It has been repeatedly claimed by the Greek Cypriot side that the application of Protocol will be well-received as a good will gesture.