Empty Rhetoric: EU Presidency and the Cyprus Problem
Recently, political elites and analysts project Cyprus upcoming EU presidency as a deadline (and catalyst) for the resolution of the Cyprus problem, the dispute between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots on the fate of their island. In reality, this is nothing more than empty rhetoric and the EU remains powerless in affecting the resolution of the dispute.
The EU’s failure to facilitate the resolution of the Cyprus problem is long-standing. When Cyprus (as represented by the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus) applied for EU membership in 1998, accession was conditioned on the reunification of the Greek-Cypriots with the Turkish-Cypriots (in the northern part of the island and under the secessionist self-declared state of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), under a unitary state. However, soon, this condition was dropped. In practise, this meant that Greek-Cypriots and the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus safeguarded their entry to the EU. On the other hand, the inclusion of Turkish-Cypriots was dependant on the reunification of the island under a unitary state, which would replace the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic in the accession process. As a result, although the prospects for EU integration led to Turkish-Cypriot approval of reunification, Greek-Cypriots remained with little incentives to contribute to solution and they finally rejected reunification before accession. Since then, although the entire island is thought to have entered the EU in 2004, it is only the Greek-Cypriot Republic that is represented at the EU level and enjoys full EU access and benefits. Turkish-Cypriots do not participate in the EU member state and their (bilateral) engagement with the EU, although greater than before, remains limited.
In this context, Cyprus’ upcoming presidency is bound to be monopolised by the Greek-Cypriots, in the same way that EU integration process has taken place so far. In practise, the solution (or not) of the Cyprus problem will not importantly implicate Cyprus’ EU affairs: the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus will go on with holding the EU presidency, in the same way that they have enjoyed representation and access to EU environment so far. Turkish-Cypriots will most probably not participate in the EU Presidency team and will continue to have limited relations the EU. As time goes by, this complex reality that the accession of a divided island created is gradually normalised. Of course, this is a situation that carries various challenges, including high political cost for the EU’s relations to Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots and technical difficulties in the EU’s role in Cyprus, especially the northern part of the island. Nevertheless, it is a situation that does not trigger incentives among Cypriot communities to pursue reunification: Greek-Cypriots are shield behind EU membership, while the pro-EU trend once prevailing among Turkish-Cypriots is gradually diminishing. In this regard, eight years after accession, the EU’s aptitude for resolution of the Cyprus conflict is further weakened. Last month, Alexander Downer, the UN Envoy to Cyprus, said that ‘It’s hard to see how it [the process of negotiations on the dispute] can go on then … so we really have to get it done before July 1 [date when Cyprus will undertake Presidency]‘. The reality is that these words represent nothing but empty rhetoric, desperate to revive a staggering negotiation process on the solution of the inter-communal dispute.


